We study the underlying structure of the two-dimensional dynamical system generated by a class of dynamic optimization models, which allow for intertemporal complementarity between adjacent periods, but which preserve the time additively separable framework of Ramsey models. Specifically, we identify conditions under which the results of the traditional Ramsey type theory are preserved even when the intertemporal independence assumption is relaxed. Local analysis of this theme has been presented by Samuelson (1971) . We establish global convergence results and relate them to the local analysis, by using the mathematical theory of two-dimensional dynamical systems. We also relate the local stability property of the stationary optimal stock to the differentiability of the optimal policy function near the stationary optimal stock, by using the Stable Manifold Theorem.
Introduction
The theory of optimal intertemporal allocation has been developed primarily for the case in which the objective function of the planner or representative agent can be written as:
where c t represents consumption at date t, w the period felicity function, and δ (0, 1) a discount factor, representing the time preference of the agent. An objective function like (1.1) leads naturally to the study of dynamic optimization problems of the following "reduced form":
subject to (x t , x t+1 ) ∈ Ω f or t ∈ {0, 1, 2, ...
where δ ∈ (0, 1) is the discount factor, X is a compact set (representing the state space), Ω ⊂ X × X is a transition possibility set, u : Ω → R is a utility function, and x ∈ X is the initial state of the system. The restrictive form of the objective function (1.1) has often been criticized, and alternative forms have been suggested. Since imposing no structure on U (c 1 , c 2 , ...) will yield very little useful information about the nature of optimal programs, the alternative formulations involve some restrictions, of course, and these basically take one of two forms.
First, one can dispense with the time-additively separable nature of (1.1), by following Koopmans (1960) and Koopmans, Diamond and Williamson (1964) , and postulate that there is an aggregator function, A, such that U (c 1 , c 2 , ...) = A(c 1 , U(c 2 , c 3 , ...)) (1.3)
A nice feature of (1.3) is that it preserves the recursive nature of the problem inherent in Ramseytype problems based on (1.1). The restriction is that the independence of tastes between periods that was present in (1.1) is also implicit in (1.3) . Optimal growth problems with (1.3) as the objective function have been investigated quite extensively, starting with Iwai (1972) ; a useful reference for this literature is Becker and Boyd (1997) . Second, one can preserve the time-additive separable form, but explicitly model the intertemporal dependence of tastes by postulating that the felicity derived by the agent in period t depends on consumption in period t(c t ), but the felicity function itself is (endogenously) determined by past consumption (c t−1 ). [The fact that "past consumption" is reflected completely in c t−1 is a mathematical simplification; consumption in several previous periods can clearly be allowed for at the expense of cumbersome notation and significantly more tedious algebraic manipulations].
This formulation leads to the objective function 1 :
U (c 1 , c 2 , ...) = ∞ t=1 δ t−1 w(c t , c t+1 ) (1.4)
Models of optimal growth with intertemporal dependence in tastes, in which the objective function is similar to (1.4), have been examined by several authors. 2 To the best of our knowledge, the specific form (1.4) was first used by Samuelson (1971) , to capture the essential features of such intertemporal dependence of tastes.
An objective function like (1.4) leads to the study of dynamic optimization problems of the following "reduced form": Maximize ∞ t=0 δ t u(x t , x t+1 , x t+2 ) Subject to (x t , x t+1 , x t+2 ) ∈ Λ for t ∈ {0, 1, 2, ...} (x 0 , x 1 ) = (x, y)
where δ ∈ (0, 1) is the discount factor, X is a compact set, Ω ⊂ X × X is a transition possibility set, Λ = {(x, y, z) : (x, y) Ω and (y, z) Ω}, u : Λ → R is a utility function, and (x, y) Ω is the initial state of the system. Notice that even under intertemporal dependence in tastes, we have a recursive structure in the dynamic optimization problem (1.5) very much like in (1.2) [and in optimization problems involving (1.3) as the objective function]. The difference is that in dealing with a one capital good model (like the standard one or two-sector models of neoclassical growth theory), the state space is X in problem (1.2), while it is a subset of X 2 in problem (1.5). Thus, for problem (1.2), (optimal) value and policy functions are defined on X, and for problem (1.5) , these functions are defined on Ω ⊂ X 2 . In terms of examining the dynamic behavior of optimal programs, we are therefore dealing with a one-dimensional dynamical system for problem (1.2) and a twodimensional dynamical system for problem (1.5) .
The structure of recursive problems like (1.5) are not as well understood as that of (1.2), and we feel that it is worthy of a systematic study. Specifically, one might explore two themes: (i) identifying the conditions under which the results of the traditional Ramsey-type theory are preserved even when the intertemporal independence assumption is relaxed; (ii) examining alternative scenarios in which the asymptotic behavior of an optimal program is qualitatively different (from its traditional Ramsey counterpart) because of the presence of intertemporal complementarity. Local analysis of the first theme has been presented by Samuelson (1971) , and of the second by Boyer (1978) , and others. Our principal interest in this paper is in establishing global results on the first theme, and in relating them to the local results, by using the mathematical theory of two-dimensional dynamical systems. 3 The plan of the paper is as follows. After describing the model in Section 2, we develop the basic properties of the (optimal) value function, V , and the (optimal) policy function, h, in Section 3. A useful tool for our study is the φ-policy function, defined on X, by φ(x) = h(x, x) for x X (1.6)
It is introduced in Section 3, and the circumstances under which it satisfies a "single-crossing condition" are examined. Section 4 might be considered as providing the global analytical counterpart to Samuelson's (1971) local analysis of "turnpike behavior" in this model. We show that when the (reducedform) utility function, u, is supermodular on its domain, Λ, then the optimal policy function is monotone increasing in both arguments. This property, together with the "single-crossing condition" on φ allows us to establish global asymptotic stability of optimal programs with respect to the (unique) stationary optimal stock, by using an interesting stability result for second-order difference schemes.
In Section 5, we provide an analysis of the local dynamics of optimal solutions. To this end, we study the fourth order difference equation, which represents the linearized version of the RamseyEuler equations near the stationary optimal stock. This equation yields four characteristic roots and we show how two of them are selected by the optimal solution (assuming that the optimal policy function is continuously differentiable in a neighborhood of the stationary optimal stock). The roots selected by the optimal solution provide information about the speed of convergence of non-stationary optimal trajectories to the stationary optimal stock.
The theory linking the derivative of the optimal policy function to the "dominated" characteristic root associated with the Ramsey-Euler equation, for the optimization problem (1.2) is, of course, well-known. To our knowledge, the corresponding theory for problem (1.5) has not been developed in the literature.
In subsection 5.3, the optimal policy function is shown to be continuously differentiable in a neighborhood of the stationary optimal stock, by using the Stable Manifold Theorem. 4 This validates the conclusions which are reached in Sections 5.1 and 5.2, by assuming this property. Ω is closed and convex.
There is (x,ȳ) ∈ Ω withȳ >x. These assumptions are standard in the literature. Note that (A.3) means that the transition possibility set Ω allows free-disposal, so long as the stock level does not exceed B. Assumption (A.4) implies the existence of expansible stocks.
Notice that for all x ∈ [0, B], we have (x, x) ∈ Ω. Associated with Ω is the correspondence Ψ : X → X, given by Ψ(x) = {y : (x, y) Ω}. Define the set:
The utility function, u, is a map from Λ to R. It is assumed to satisfy: (A. 5) u is continuous and concave on Λ, and strictly concave in the third argument. (A. 6) u is non-decreasing in the first argument, and non-increasing in the third argument. In what follows, we will normalize u(0, 0, 0) = 0; also, we will denote max
The discount factor, δ, reflects how future utilities are evaluated compared to current ones. We assume:
(A.7) 0 < δ < 1
Programs
The initial condition (which should be considered to be historically given) is specified by a pair (x, y) in Ω. A program (x t ) from (x, y) is a sequence satisfying
Thus, in specifying a program, the period 0 and period 1 states are historically given. Choice of future states starts from t = 2. Notice that for a program (x t ) from (x, y) ∈ Ω, we have (x t , x t+1 , x t+2 ) ∈ Λ for t ≥ 0.
An optimal program (x t ) from (x, y) ∈ Ω is a program from (x, y) satisfying
for every program (x t ) from (x, y). Under our assumptions, a standard argument suffices to ensure the existence of an optimal program from every initial condition (x, y) ∈ Ω. Using Assumptions (A.2) and (A.5), it can also be shown that this optimal program is unique.
Value and Policy Functions
We can define a value function, V : Ω → R by
where (x t ) is the optimal program from (x, y). Then, V is concave and continuous on Ω.
It can be shown that for each (x, y) ∈ Ω, the Bellman equation
holds. Also, V is the unique continuous function on Ω, which solves the functional equation (2.4). For each (x, y) ∈ Ω, we denote by h(x, y) the value of z which maximizes [u(x, y, z)+δV (y, z)] among all z satisfying (y, z) ∈ Ω. Then, a program (x t ) from (x, y) ∈ Ω is an optimal program from (x, y) if and only if:
This, in turn, holds if and only if
We will call h the (optimal) policy function. It can be shown by using standard arguments that h is continuous on Ω.
Two Examples

Optimal Growth with Intertemporally Dependent Preferences
The example (which follows Samuelson (1971) and Boyer (1978) closely) captures the feature that tastes between periods are intertemporally dependent. Such a model can be described in terms of a production function, f, a welfare function, w, and a discount factor, δ. Let X = [0, B] be the state space with 0 < B < ∞. The production function, f , is a function from X to itself which satisfies:
f is increasing, concave and continuous on X. The welfare function, w, is a function from X 2 to R, which satisfies: (w)
w is continuous and concave on X 2 , and strictly concave in the second argument; it is non-decreasing in both arguments.
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The discount factor, δ, is as usual assumed to satisfy:
A program, in this framework, is described by a sequence (k t , c t ), where k t denotes the capital stock and c t the consumption in period t. The initial condition is specified by (k, c) ≥ 0, where
Formally, a program (k t , c t ) from (k, c) is a sequence satisfying
An optimal program from (k, c) is a program (k t ,c t ) satisfying
To reduce the optimality exercise in (2.8) subject to (2.7) to the one in (1.5), we can proceed as follows. First, the transition possibility set, Ω, can be defined as:
Second, the reduced form utility function can be defined, for (x, y, z) in Λ as:
Finally, the initial condition (k, c) in the example, translates to the initial condition in the framework of Section 2.2 as (x, y) = (f −1 (k 1 + c 1 ), k 1 ). That is, x is the capital stock (in period 0) which produced the output (k 1 + c 1 ) in period 1, that was split up between consumption (c 1 ) and capital stock (k 1 ) in period 1; y is the capital stock in period 1. The choice of consumption decisions, c t , starts from t ≥ 2; correspondingly, the state variable, x t , is determined for t ≥ 2 by the following equation:
It is worth noting that in the model of Samuelson (1971) there is no maximization with respect to c 1 . This is because in order for his problem to be well-posed, one needs to know both k 0 and c 1 (and therefore both x 0 and x 1 in terms of the problem stated in (1.5)) The information about c 1 is needed to define the welfare function w(c 1 ; c 2 ). That is the welfare in period 2 depends on the choice of c 2 , but the welfare function itself is determined endogenously by past consumption ( c 1 ).
6
6 Of course, variations of problem (1.5) can arise, where the last line of (1.5) would simply say x 0 = x. Solving such a problem would involve solving (1.5) and in addition solving for the "correct" x 1 . Clearly, an optimal solution of such a problem must solve (1.5), and therefore inherit all the dynamic properties of such a solution, as described in this paper.
Optimal Harvesting of a Renewable Resource with Delayed Recruitment
The theory of management of renewable resources deals with the issue of optimal harvesting of biological populations, such as various species of marine life. For many species, recruitment to the breeding population takes place only after a delay. Clark (1976) has modeled this phenomenon by describing the population dynamics by a delay-difference equation, instead of the standard first-order difference equation which is commonly used in the literature on renewable resources. We describe a simple version of his model where the delay involved is two periods.
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The model can be described formally in terms of a recruitment function, F , a return function, W , a survival coefficient, λ, and a discount factor, δ.
The recruitment function, F , is a function from R + to itself which satisfies: (F) F (0) = 0; F is increasing, concave and continuous on X;
The return function, w, is a function from R + to R, which satisfies:
(W) W is continuous, non-decreasing and strictly concave on R + . The survival coefficient, λ, satisfies:
(s) 0 < λ < 1. The discount factor, δ, is as usual assumed to satisfy:
, and (iii) B < f(x) < x for x > B. Thus, it is natural to choose the state space to be X = [0, B].
A program, in this framework, is described by a sequence (k t , c t ), where k t denotes the biomass of the adult breeding population and c t the harvest of this population in period t. The initial condition is specified by (k, k ) ≥ 0, where k ≤ B and k ≤ B.
Formally, a program (k t , c t ) from (k, k ) is a sequence satisfying
and this justifies our choice of the state space as
To explain the population dynamics, the adult breeding population k 0 at time 0 yields a "recruitment" to the population in period 2 (that is, after a delay of two periods) of F (k 0 ). Part of the adult breeding population k 1 at time 1 does not survive beyond period 1; the remaining part is λk 1 . The total available output of the renewable resource at time 2 is therefore F (k 0 ) + λk 1 . A part of this resource (c 2 ) is harvested in period 2. The remainder of the resource ( F (k 0 )+λk 1 −c 2 ) becomes the adult breeding population k 2 at time 2. This process is then repeated indefinitely.
To reduce the optimality exercise in (2.11) subject to (2.10) to the one in (1.5), we can proceed as follows. First, the set, Λ, can be defined as:
Finally, the initial condition (k, k ) in the example, translates to the initial condition in the framework of Section 2.2 as (x, y) = (k, k ). The choice of consumption decisions, c t , starts from t ≥ 2; correspondingly, the state variable, x t , is determined for t ≥ 2 by the following equation:
Note that the dynamic optimization problem of the form (1.5) arises in the renewable resource example from the (biological) production side of the model rather than the preference side.
Basic Properties of Value and Policy Functions
In this section, we examine some basic properties of the value and policy functions. These properties will be useful in conducting the analysis in the following sections.
Value Function
We proceed under the following additional assumption:
Assumption (A.8) is a δ-productivity assumption jointly on (Λ, u, δ). It is analogous to the δ-productivity assumption in the usual reduced-form model, where it is used to establish the existence of a non-trivial stationary optimal stock. Lemma 1 Let N ≥ 2 be a given positive integer. Defining x = δ Nx , we have (x, x/δ) ∈ Ω, and
Proof. Since (x,x/δ) ∈ Ω and (0, 0) ∈ Ω, we have (δ nx , δ n (x/δ)) ∈ Ω for n ≥ 1. Using this observation, the sequence (
, and we have
which establishes the Lemma.
Proposition 1
The value function, V , satisfies the property:
Proof. For (x, x/δ) ∈ Ω, and 0 < λ < 1, we have
Using Lemma 1, and defining the sequence {x(N)} by:
Proposition 2 The value function, V , satisfies the property:
Proof. For 0 < x ≤x, we have (x, x/δ) ∈ Ω, and (x, 0) ∈ Ω, so (δx
Policy Function
A useful tool, related to the policy function, is the φ-policy function defined for x ∈ X by:
That is, φ gives us the optimal policy when the arguments in h happen to take on identical values.
In the standard reduced-form model, if x t were constant for two successive periods along an optimal program, the constant value would have to be a stationary optimal stock. Here, given x t−1 = x t = x in X, φ(x) is not necessarily equal to x; in fact, it will typically be different from x. If φ(x) = x, then x would be a stationary optimal stock in the present framework.
Assumption (A.9) is a bounded-steepness assumption on the utility function, and this is ensured by making u Lipschitz-continuous, with Lipschitz constant A. The norm used in (A.9) is the sum-norm; that is, (x, y, z) = |x| + |y| + |z| for (x, y, z) in R 3 . [In the usual reducedform model, a condition like (A.9) was introduced by Gale (1967) , to establish the existence of shadow-prices, associated with optimal programs].
Proposition 3 There is a > 0 such that for all x ∈ ( 0, a), φ(x) > x.
Proof. Suppose, on the contrary, there is a sequence (x s ), such that x s → 0 as s → ∞, and
Using Proposition 2, we can find a 1 > 0, such that for x ∈ (0, a 1 ), we have
Since x s → 0, we can find s large enough for which 0 < x s < a 1 . Pick such an x s and call it x. Then x ∈ (0, a 1 ) and φ(x) ≤ x. Denote φ(x) by y, and h(x, y) by z.
Since y ≤ x, and (y, z) ∈ Ω, we have (x, z) ∈ Ω, and (x, y, z) ∈ Λ,and:
the final inequality following from (A.9). We can now write:
so that:
by using (A.9) again. Thus, using
We now introduce an additional assumption for our next result.
) is an expression of the fact that "inaction" can produce at least as much utility as "excessive action". In the context of the standard aggregative growth model, considered in Section 2.4.1, it translates to the fact that the consumption level associated with the maximum sustainable stock is 0 and so is the consumption associated with the zero stock. Actually the standard aggregative growth model does not model disutility of effort directly. Typically, maintaining high stocks involves considerable effort, which has disutility, and this will reinforce the circumstances under which (A.10) will hold.
Proposition 4
The φ-policy function satisfies
Define the sequence (x t ) as follows:
Then, (x t ) is a program from (B, B), and we have: Proposition 5 There is some x * (0, B), such that x * is a stationary optimal stock; that is,
Proof. By Proposition 4, φ(B) < B. By Proposition 3, we can find
A Single Crossing Condition
In the following sections, we will find it useful to assume that the φ-policy function (introduced in Section 3.2) has the following "single-crossing property":
Given Propositions 3 and 4, there is a stationary optimal stock in (0, B), and the singlecrossing property holds if there is a unique stationary optimal stock in (0, B). Note that if x ∈ (0, B) is a stationary optimal stock, then h(x, x) = x, and so:
In the example discussed in Section 2.4.1, with w and f both C 1 , w 1 > 0 and w 2 > 0, denoting f(x) − x by c, condition (3.7) is satisfied only if:
This implies that δf (x) = 1. Since f is strictly concave, there can be only one stationary optimal stock in (0, B), and the single-crossing property is verified.
If u is C 2 on Λ, then (3.7) has a unique solution if the function:
has a negative derivative, wherever it has a zero. This amounts to the condition:
being satisfied at any x [the derivatives being evaluated at (x, x, x)] at which H(x) = 0. For δ ≈ 1, (3.9) is clearly satisfied if u has a negative-definite Hessian.
Turnpike Behavior
In this section, we will provide sufficient conditions under which one can establish global asymptotic stability of the stationary optimal stock (turnpike property). This demonstrates that "one can relax the independence assumption somewhat and still derive the usual known results", a point indicated earlier by Samuelson (1971) , using local analysis around the turnpike. A crucial role in our global analysis is played by the assumption of supermodularity of the utility function 8 in its three variables, a concept we define below analogously to the more familiar two variable case.
Supermodularity of the Utility Function
provided (x , y) and (x, y ) Ω. If G is C 2 on Ω, then it is well-known that G is supermodular on Ω if and only if G 12 ≥ 0 on Ω In our case, the utility function, u : Λ → R is a function of three variables, and we may define supermodularity of it as follows. In the C 2 case, we would now like to have all the three cross-partials of u to be non-negative; that is u 12 , u 13 and u 23 ≥ 0 on Λ. In the general (not necessarily differentiable) case, this translates to the following definition.
The utility function u :
, since u 12 ≥ 0 and u 13 ≥ 0, (y − y) ≥ 0 and (z − z) ≥ 0. Thus, we get A ≥ 0, establishing (i). Conditions (ii) and (iii) can be verified similarly.
Both of the above definitions are, of course, special cases of the general definition of supermodularity of a function on a lattice, as given by Topkis (1968 Topkis ( , 1998 ).
An Example
In order to understand the restriction imposed by the assumption of supermodularity of u, we consider the assumption in the context of the example discussed in Section 2.4.1, when w and f are both C 2 on their domains. We can calculate the first-order partial derivatives of u as follows:
Since w 1 > 0 and w 2 > 0, it follows that u 1 > 0 and u 3 < 0, as required in (A.6).
The second-order cross partial derivatives of u can be calculated as follows:
Thus, in order for u to be supermodular, (i) we need the marginal utility of present consumption to be declining in past consumption (w 12 < 0), sometimes referred to as Edgeworth-Pigou substitutability, and (ii) we need the magnitude of this cross effect (−w 12 ) to be "small" relative to the magnitudes of the own effects (−w 11 ) and (−w 22 ). We state requirement (ii) loosely, since the magnitude of the marginal product of capital is involved beside the second-order derivatives of w. However, the requirement (ii) can be seen most transparently at the steady state, where δf (x * ) = 1. There, the requirement of supermodularity translates to the condition that in the symmetric matrix:
the diagonal terms dominate the off-diagonal terms. We now provide a specific example of the framework discussed in Section 2.4.1, to show that all the assumptions made on the reduced-form model can be verified with suitable restrictions on the parameters of the primitive-form. Consider the production function, f, defined by:
(where 1 < p < 2 and q > 0), and the welfare function, w, defined by:
where a > 0, b > 0, α > 0, β > 0 and θ > 0.Note that at x = B = (p − 1)/q, we have
To ensure that w is increasing in both components of consumption, we impose the following restrictions:
These restrictions ensure that u 1 (x, y, z) > 0 and u 3 (x, y, z) < 0 on Λ, since f (x) > 0 on X.
Notice that w 11 = −2b < 0 and w 22 = −2β < 0, so, to ensure concavity of w, we can assume
This ensures that u is concave on Λ, since f is concave on X. Further, since u 33 (x, y, z) = w 22 (f (x) − y, f(y) − z) = −2β < 0, u is strictly concave in its third argument.
We have w 12 = −θ < 0 so that u 13 > 0 on Λ. To ensure that u 23 > 0 on Λ, we assume that
Finally, to ensure that u 12 > 0 on Λ, we assume that (−w 11 ) > (−w 12 )f (0); that is,
Thus, under the restrictions (R1) -(R4), assumptions (w), (f ) are satisfied, and so are Assumptions (A.1) -(A.6). Further, u is supermodular on Λ.
For specific numerical values of the parameters, ensuring that all the above restrictions are simultaneously satisfied, take p = (3/2), q = (1/2), so that B = 1 and X = [0, 1]. Choosing b = β = 1, a = 3, α = 5, and θ = (1/2), it is easy to check that the restrictions (R1) -(R4) are satisfied.
Monotonicity of the Policy Function
The principal result (Theorem 1) of this subsection is that if the utility function is supermodular then the (optimal) policy function is monotone non-decreasing in each component.
In the case usually treated, where the reduced form utility function is a function of two variables, if the utility function is supermodular, then the policy function is monotone nondecreasing, and this can be established by ensuring that the value function (a function of a single variable) is monotone non-decreasing. This property of the value function is straightforward, given the free-disposal property of the transition possibility set and the fact that the utility function is monotone non-decreasing in its first argument.
In the present context, the value function is a function of two variables, and we need to show that the value function is supermodular in these two variables (Proposition 6), when the utility function is supermodular in its three variables. To obtain the supermodularity of the value function from the supermodularity of the utility function, the natural route suggested is to establish supermodularity for each finite-horizon value function, and then obtain this property for the infinite horizon value function as a limit of the finite-horizon ones. The first part of this two-step procedure (Lemma 2) follows from the general result of Topkis (1968) , so we state the result without a proof.
Lemma 2 Let G : Ω → R be a concave, continuous and supermodular function on Ω. If u is supermodular on Λ, then the function H : Ω → R given by
is well-defined, and is a concave, continuous and supermodular function on Ω.
Proposition 6 If u is supermodular on Λ, then V is supermodular on Ω.
Proof. Define a sequence of functions, V t : Ω → R given by
Then V 0 is a concave, continuous and supermodular function on Ω. Using Lemma 2, V t is a concave, continuous and supermodular function on Ω for each t ≥ 0.
Since |u(x, y, z)| ≤B on Λ, we have |V t (x, y)| ≤B/(1 − δ) on Ω for all t ≥ 0. To see this, note that it is clearly true for t = 0. Assuming this is true for t = T ≥ 0, we have
since u is non-decreasing in its first argument and u(0, 0, 0) = 0. Suppose V t+1 (x, y) ≥ V t (x, y) for t = 0, ..., T where T ≥ 0. We now show that the inequality must hold for t = T + 1 as well. Letz be the solution of the maximization problem
given (x, y) ∈ Ω. Then, by definition of V T +2 , we have
This completes the induction proof.
ThenV is well-defined and is a concave, continuous and supermodular function on Ω.
Given (x, y) ∈ Ω, let z t be the solution to the maximization problem:
The sequence {z t } is bounded, and has a convergent subsequence, converging to somez; clearlȳ z ∈ Ψ(y). For the subsequence on which z t converges toz, taking limits we havē
Also, for all z ∈ Ψ(y), we have
and soV (x, y) ≥ u(x, y, z) + δV (y, z) (4.13)
Using (4.12) and (4.13) we havē
Thus,V is the value function, V , of problem (2.4), and V is supermodular on Ω.
Theorem 1 If u is supermodular on Λ, then h is non-decreasing in each component.
Proof. Let (x, y) and (x , y ) ∈ Ω with (x , y ) ≥ (x, y). Define z = h(x, y) and z = h(x , y ). We claim that z ≥ z. Suppose, on the contrary, that z < z. We know that
Since (y, z) Ω and z < z, (y, z ) Ω, and
Since (y, z) Ω and y ≥ y, (y , z) Ω, and
Thus, we get
Since u is supermodular on Λ, and (x , y ) ≥ (x, y) and z > z , u(x, y, z ) + u(x , y , z) ≥ u(x, y, z) + u(x , y , z ) (4.15)
Since V is supermodular on Ω, and y ≥ y and z > z ,
Adding (4.15) and (4.16), we contradict (4.14).
Global Dynamics
In this section we study the global dynamics of the two-dimensional dynamical system, (Ω, Γ) where Γ is a map from Ω to Ω given by
For (x, y) ∈ Ω, we have h(x, y) ∈ Ψ(y), and so (y, h(x, y)) ∈ Ω.
We maintain the assumption that u is supermodular on Λ, and so h is non-decreasing in both its arguments. We also maintain the single-crossing condition on φ, introduced in Section 3c.
The principal result of this subsection (Theorem 2) is that if (x t ) is an optimal program from (x, y), where (x, y) ∈ Ω and (x, y) >> 0, then x t converges to x * as t → ∞, thus exhibiting global asymptotic stability ("turnpike property"). Proof. Define m = min{x 0 , x 1 , x * } and M = max{x 0 , x 1 , x * }, where x * is given by the single-crossing condition (SC).
We show that x t ≥ m for all t ≥ 0. This is clear for t = 0, 1. Suppose x t ≥ m for t = 0, 1, ...T , where T ≥ 1, then
The first inequality in (4.17) follows from the monotonicity of h in both arguments, the definition of m, and the fact that x T −1 and x T are at least as large as m. The second inequality follows from the fact that m ≤ x * and condition (SC). This establishes by induction that x t ≥ m for t ≥ 0.
We show that x t ≤ M for all t ≥ 0. This being clear for t = 0, 1, suppose x t ≤ M for t = 0, 1, ..., T , were T ≥ 1. Then
The first inequality in (4.18) follows from the monotonicity of h in both arguments, the definition of M, and the facts that x T −1 ≤ M, x T ≤ M by hypothesis. The second inequality follows from the fact that M ≥ x * and condition (SC). This establishes by induction that x t ≤ M for t ≥ 0. We also note that
Define a = lim inf t→∞ x t . We claim that a ≥ x * . Otherwise, if a < x * , then using a ≥ m > 0,
we have φ(a) > a and so we can find ε > 0 such that (a − ε) > 0 and φ(a − ε) > a + ε. By definition of a, we can find N such that for t ≥ N, x t ≥ (a − ε). Thus, for t ≥ N ,
But this means that lim inf t→∞ x t ≥ a + ε, a contradiction. Thus, we must have a ≥ x * .
Define A = lim sup t→∞ x * t . We claim that A ≤ x * . Suppose, on the contrary, A > x * . We know that A ≤ φ(B) [by (4.19)]< B [by Proposition 4] . Using condition (SC) we have φ(A) < A, and so we can find ε > 0 such that (A + ε) < B, and φ(A + ε) < (A − ε). By definition of A, we can find N such that for t ≥ N, x t ≤ (A + ε). Thus for t ≥ N,
But this means that lim sup t→∞ x t ≤ A − ε, a contradiction. Thus, we must have A ≤ x * .
Since A ≥ a, we have
which proves that a = A = x * , and so (x t ) converges and lim
Remark 1 The style of proof is similar to that used in Hautus and Bolis (1979), but since the domain of definition of h and φ are different in our framework from theirs, we cannot appeal directly to their result.
Remarks on Models of Habit Formation
The literature on habit formation 9 studies optimization problems of the type described in Section 2.4.1. The model of Boyer (1978) on habit formation, where utility is assumed to be increasing both in current and in past consumption, can be treated as a special case of the model we described in Section 2.4.1.
10 However, in many models of habit formation, utility is assumed to be increasing in present consumption, but decreasing in past consumption. The idea is that a high consumption in the past means that a person gets used to a higher standard, and therefore this has a negative effect on her evaluation of current consumption.
Assumption (w) in the example described in Section 2.4.1 (and more generally assumption (A.6) of the reduced-form model described in Section 2.1) rules out such environments of habit formation. However, the methods and results of our paper continue to be applicable to some of these environments. We elaborate on this remark by presenting an example of habit formation where utility is assumed to be increasing in present consumption and decreasing in past consumption, and yet the main monotonicity and global asymptotic stability results of our paper continue to hold.
The framework of the example is similar to the one described in Section 2.4.1, with a production function, f , satisfying assumption (f), a discount factor, δ, satisfying assumption (d); however, the welfare function, w, is a function from X 2 to R, which satisfies: (w') w is continuous and concave on X 2 , and strictly concave in the second argument; it is non-decreasing in the second argument and non-increasing in the first argument.
We now provide a specific example of this framework, which is a variation of the example discussed in Section 4.2..Consider the production function, f , defined by:
Here p = (3/2) and q = (1/2), so that B = 1.
The welfare function, w, is defined by:
where a ∈ (0, 1), b ≥ 2, and A > 4ab. The discount factor, δ, is chosen to be in (0.8, 1).
For any x ∈ (0, 1), we have f(x) > x, and so the stationary program (x, x, x, ...) is feasible. Denoting f(x) − x by c, we note that c ∈ (0, 1) is the constant consumption along this program. Given the form of w, we have w(c, c) > 0.
Note that w is C 2 on X 2 ; the partial derivatives of w can be calculated as follows:
Thus, w is clearly increasing in d and decreasing in c on X 2 . Further, it is strictly concave in (c, d) on X 2 . It can be checked that for all c ∈ (0, 1), we have w 1 (c, c) + w 2 (c, c) > 0, as required in the study of Samuelson (1971) and the habit formation model of Sundaresan (1989) .
The properties (A.1)-(A.4) of the corresponding reduced form model (Λ, u, δ) can be verified quite easily. To verify other properties, we can compute the relevant first and second-order partial derivatives of u as in Section 4.2. Since w 1 < 0 and w 2 > 0, it follows that u 1 < 0 and u 3 < 0, while u 2 > 0. Note that (A.6) is clearly violated. By definition of u, it is clearly concave (given concavity of w and f ) and continuous on Λ, so that (A.5) is satisfied.
Since w 12 = 0 and w 11 < 0, w 22 < 0, we have u 13 = 0 and u 12 > 0, u 23 > 0. Thus, u is supermodular on Λ. 
2 ) > f(x) − (x/δ), and so using w 2 > 0, we have:
the last inequality following from (7). Thus, (A.8) is verified. Assumption (A.9) is clearly satisfied since both f and w have bounded steepness. Finally, Assumption (A.10) is satisfied, since u(0, 0, 0) = 0 = u (B, B, B) . To summarize, in this example, all the assumptions except (A.6) are satisfied; further, u is supermodular on Λ.
Since the analysis in our paper relies at various points on the use of assumption (A.6), our methods are not directly applicable to this example of habit formation. However, slight modifications of our methods can be used to verify that (i) the policy function satisfies the single-crossing property; (ii) the value function is supermodular on its domain, and the policy function is non-decreasing in each of its arguments. Thus, Theorem 2, which uses only these properties of the model, continues to be valid in this example of habit formation. The details of this verification can be found in Mitra and Nishimura (2003) .
We should add that there are clearly models of habit formation which cannot be analyzed in terms of the methods used in our paper, and the results of our paper do not apply to those frameworks. For example, one might follow Abel (1990) and consider a particular specification of the habit-formation model where:
(1−α) where α ∈ (0, 1)
In this case, not only is w 1 < 0 and w 2 > 0, so that the corresponding reduced-form model violates (A.6), but w itself is not a concave function of (c t , c t+1 ), so that the corresponding reduced-form model also violates (A.5). The dynamic optimization problem in (1.5) is then one involving a non-concave objective function. This takes one beyond the scope of environments that can be handled with the methods used in our paper.
Local Dynamics
In this section, we provide an analysis of the local dynamics of optimal solutions near a stationary optimal stock. To this end, we study (in subsection 5.1) the behavior of the optimal policy function (assuming that it is continuously differentiable in a neighborhood of the stationary optimal stock) and obtain restrictions on the two characteristic roots associated with the linearized version of it near the stationary optimal stock. Next, we show (in subsection 5.2) that each of these characteristic roots must also be a characteristic root of the linearized version of the Ramsey-Euler equation near the stationary optimal stock. We then examine the fourth order difference equation, which represents the linearized version of the Ramsey-Euler equations near the stationary optimal stock, and we show which two of them are selected by the optimal this example.
solution. The roots selected by the optimal solution provide information about the speed of convergence of non-stationary optimal trajectories to the stationary optimal stock. The assumption of supermodularity of the utility function is not used in the above analysis. In subsection 5.3, the optimal policy function is shown to be continuously differentiable in a neighborhood of the stationary optimal stock, by using the Stable Manifold Theorem. This provides a rigorous basis for the analysis carried out in subsections 5.1 and 5.2. 
Characteristic Roots Associated with the Optimal Policy Function
We proceed with our local analysis of the optimal policy function by making strong smoothness assumptions.
We assume that there is ε > 0 such that the utility function is
] with u 1 > 0, u 3 < 0 and u 13 > 0, and a negativedefinite Hessian on N. Further, we assume that there is a neighborhood M of (x * , x * ) on which V is C 2 and h is C 1 .
13 Clearly, we can choose a smaller neighborhood M of M such that for all (x, y) in M, (x, y, h(x, y)) is in N and (y, h(x, y)) is in M .
In terms of the example of Section 2.4, the restriction u 13 > 0 is satisfied if w is C 2 with w 12 < 0 [and f is C 1 , with f > 0]. This restriction is quite important: it implies that the policy function is monotone increasing in the first argument on M .
Proposition 7
The policy function, h, satisfies h 1 (x, y) > 0 for (x, y) M.
Proof. Let (x, y) M. Then h(x, y) solves the maximization problem:
Since (y, h(x, y)) M and (x, y, h(x, y)) is in N ,
This is an identity in (x, y) M, and so, differentiating with respect to x,
We have V 22 ≤ 0 [by concavity of V ], and u 33 < 0 [since the Hessian of u is negative definite]; thus u 33 (x, y, h(x, y)) + δV 22 (y, h(x, y)) < 0, and so h 1 (x, y) > 0. If x * > 0 is the unique positive stationary optimal stock, another useful property of the optimal policy function may be obtained, namely:
Recall that the circumstances under which there is a unique positive stationary optimal stock were discussed in connection with the single-crossing condition in Section 3.3.
Proposition 8 Suppose x
* is the unique positive stationary optimal stock. Then
which establishes the result. Given the non-linear difference equation
the linear difference equation associated with it (near the stationary optimal stock, x * ) is given by
where q denotes h 1 (x * , x * ) and p denotes h 2 (x * , x * ), and a t is to be interpreted as
The characteristic equation associated with the equation (5.2) is
Denoting by λ 1 and λ 2 the roots of (5.3), we observe that
These are explicity given by the formula:
Under our assumptions we have the information that
Since q > 0, we can use (5.4) to infer that the roots λ 1 , λ 2 are real and they are of opposite signs. Without loss of generality, let us denote the positive root by λ 1 and the negative root by λ 2 . Using (5.4), (5.6), we have
Now, if λ 1 > 1, then we would get (1−λ 1 ) < 0, and (1−λ 1 )λ 2 > 0 (since λ 2 < 0) contradicting (5.7). Thus, we can conclude that
Now, using (5.4), we have (−λ 2 ) = λ 1 − p ≤ λ 1 ≤ 1. Thus, neither characteristic root can exceed 1 in absolute value.
Characteristic Roots Associated with the Ramsey-Euler Equation
Consider the Ramsey-Euler equation:
In particular, of course, x t+s = x * for s = 0, 1, 2, 3, 4 satisfies (5.9):
If we use the Mean-Value theorem around (x * , x * , x * ) to evaluate the difference between the left-hand sides of (5.9) and (5.10), but ignore the second-order terms (so that one obtains a "first-order" or "linear" approximation to the difference) we get (dropping the point of evaulation (x * , x * , x * ) to ease the writing) the expression:
If we substitute β t+s for ε t+s (s = 0, 1, 2, 3, 4), and equate the resulting expression to zero, we get the characteristic equation associated with the Ramsey-Euler equation (5.9):
The idea is that the roots of this characteristic equation will reflect local behavior around the stationary optimal stock, x * , of solutions to Ramsey-Euler equations. We now show that the characteristic roots associated with the optimal policy function, which we analyzed in Section 5.1, must be solutions to the characteristic equation (5.11) . By continuity of the optimal policy function, we can choose a neighborhood M of (x * , x * ) such that for all (x, y) in M , (y, h(x, y)), (h(x, y), h(y, h(x, y))) and (h(y, h(x, y)), h(h(x, y), h(y, h(x, y))) are in M , and (x, y, h(x, y)), (y, h(x, y), h(y, h(x, y))) and (h(x, y), h(y, h(x, y)), h(h(x, y), h(y, h(x, y)))) are in N . Thus, the Ramsey-Euler equation yields the following identity in (x, y):
If we differentiate W with respect to x and evaluate the derivatives of u at (x * , x * , x * ), and the derivatives of h at (x * , x * ), then the derivative ∂W (x * , x * )/∂x must be equal to zero. We can write the derivative (after dropping the points of evaluation (x * , x * , x * ) and (x * , x * ) to ease the writing) as: 
Similarly, if we differentiate W with respect to y, and evaluate the derivatives of u at (x * , x * , x * ), and the derivatives of h at (x * , x * ), then the derivative ∂W (x * , x * )/∂y must be equal to zero. We can write the derivative (after dropping the points of evaluation (x * , x * , x * ) and (x * , x * ) to ease the writing) as:
Rearranging terms yields the derivative:
We recall from Section 5.1 that if λ is a characteristic root associated with the optimal policy function, then (λ) 2 = h 2 λ + h 1 . Using this information in (5.13) and (5.14), we get:
This completes the verification of our claim. We now show how the characteristic roots associated with the optimal policy function (analyzed in Section 5.1) can be found by calculating the characteristic roots of (5.11) .
Notice that β = 0 is not a solution to (5.11) since u 13 = 0. We can, therefore, use the transformed variable:
to examine the roots of (5.11). Using this transformation, (5.11) becomes Denoting the roots of (5.15), which is a quadratic in µ, by µ 1 and µ 2 , we note that
so these roots are necessarily real. We denote the positive root by µ 1 and the negative root by µ 2 . Given µ i (i = 1, 2), we can obtain the corresponding roots of β by solving the quadratic
We denote the roots of (5.18) corresponding to µ 1 by β 1 and β 2 [with
and the roots of (5.18) corresponding to µ 2 by β 3 and β 4 [with
Define the function F : R 2 → R by
Then β 1 and β 2 are the roots of F(β; µ 1 ) = 0, and β 3 and β 4 are the roots of F(β; µ 2 ) = 0. Using our analysis in Section 5.1, we can show that the roots β 1 and β 2 are real, and
To see this, recall that λ 1 and λ 2 are solutions of (5.3). These are real and of opposite signs. Thus, examining (5.19) , it is clear that λ 1 and λ 2 must correspond to different µ i . This means that β 1 and β 2 are real, and so are β 3 and β 4 . Now, note that since β 1 and β 2 solve the equation
and µ 1 > 0, we have β 1 β 2 = (1/δ) > 0 and (β 1 + β 2 ) = (µ 1 /δ) > 0. Thus, β 1 and β 2 are both positive. Since β 3 and β 4 are roots of the equation
we have β 3 β 4 = (1/δ) > 0 and β 3 + β 4 = (µ 2 /δ) < 0. Thus β 3 and β 4 are of the same sign, and they must both be negative. It follows from the above analysis that λ 1 must be one of the roots β 1 and β 2 , and λ 2 must be one of the roots β 3 and β 4 . Further, since λ 1 ≤ 1, and β 1 β 2 = (1/δ) > 1, λ 1 = β 1 and β 2 ≥ (1/δ). This establishes (5.20) .
Similarly, we can show that:
Since (−λ 2 ) ≤ 1, and β 3 β 4 = (1/δ) > 1, (−λ 2 ) = (−β 3 ) and (−β 4 ) ≥ (1/δ). This establishes (5.23).
Differentiability of the Optimal Policy Function
In Section 5.1, we assumed that the optimal policy function was continuously differentiable in a neighborhood of the steady state, x * . We used this to obtain the characteristic roots associated with the optimal policy function, and to relate them (in Section 5.2) to the characteristic roots associated with the Ramsey-Euler equation. To complete our analysis, we need to show that the optimal policy function is indeed continuously differentiable in a neighborhood of the steady state, x * . We do this by applying the Stable Manifold Theorem.
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We have seen in Section 5.2 that the characteristic roots (β 1 , β 2 , β 3 , β 4 ) associated with the equation (5.11) satisfy the restrictions:
We assume now that the generic case in (5.24) holds; that is, the weak inequalities in (5.24) are replaced by strict inequalities:
We wish to analyze the behavior of the Ramsey-Euler dynamical system near the steady state, x * . To this end, we define:
and ε is as given in Section 5.1]. Then, F is C 1 on N . We note that:
and so we can apply the implicit function theorem 15 to obtain an open setŨ containing (x * , x * , x * , x * ), and an open set V containing x * , and a unique function Φ :Ũ → V, such that:
and:
Further, Φ is C 1 onŨ. Clearly, we can pick an open setÛ ⊂Ũ, withÛ containing (x * , x * , x * , x * ), 14 The use of stable manifold theory to optimal growth was pioneered by Scheinkman (1976) . Since then, it has figured prominently in the theoretical work of Araujo and Scheinkman (1977) and Santos (1991) , and in numerous applications of this theory to dynamic macroeconomic models. 15 See, for example, Rosenlicht (1986) , p.205-209.
Thus, U is a neighborhood of (0, 0, 0, 0), a translation of the setÛ by subtraction of the point (x * , x * , x * , x * ) from each point (v, w, x, y) ∈Û . Now, define G : U → R Define the Vandermonde matrix: Now, denoting by A the Jacobian matrix J G (0), we can verify (using (5.30),(5.32) and (5.11)) that: This means that (β 1 , β 3 , β 2 , β 4 ) are the characteristic roots of A, with the column vectors of P constituting a set of characteristic vectors of A, corresponding to these characteristic roots. The Vandermonde matrix is known to be non-singular 16 , so we get the spectral decomposition:
Returning now to our dynamical system (5.29), we rewrite it as:
Multiplying through in (5.37) by P −1 , we obtain:
Thus, using (5.36), and defining new variables Y = P −1 X, we get:
Denote by U the set {Y : Y = P −1 X for some X ∈ U }, and define g : U → R 4 as follows:
Applying the theorem in our context (with r = 1) we get the C 1 function H with the properties stated above. We wish to conclude from this that the policy function, h, is C 1 in a neighborhood of (x * , x * ). First, we note that H(0, 0) = (0, 0). To see this, we check that f (0, 0, 0, 0) = g(0, 0, 0, 0) = (0, 0, 0, 0) by (5.41), so that f n (0, 0, 0, 0) = (0, 0, 0, 0), and so by the Stable Manifold Theorem, (0, 0, 0, 0) ∈ graph(H). That is, H(0, 0) = (0, 0).
Next, we define a function, K : non-singular. To see this, denote P −1 by R, and write R as follows:
where each R ij (with i = 1, 2; j = 1, 2) a 2 × 2 matrix. Then, we have:
where I is the 2 × 2 identity matrix, and 0 is the 2 × 2 null matrix. Thus, the matrix (D j K i (0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0)) is non-singular if and only if R 22 is non-singular. To verify that R 22 is non-singular, we write (by definition of R) :
where each P ij (with i = 1, 2; j = 1, 2) is a 2 × 2 sub-matrix of P . This yields the equations:
Clearly, P 11 is non-singular, since det(P 11 ) = β 3 − β 1 < 0 (by (5.25)). Thus,
(from the first equation of (5.45)) and using this in the second equation of (5.45), we obtain R 22 [P 22 − P 21 P −1 11 P 12 ] = I. This establishes that R 22 is non-singular. We can now use the implicit function theorem to obtain an open set E ⊂ R 2 containing (0, 0), an open set C ⊂ C containing (0, 0), and an open set E ⊂ R 2 containing (0, 0), and unique functions L 1 : E → E and L 2 : E → C , such that:
Using the definition of K, we have from (5.46) :
Now, we look at the optimal policy function, h. Pick 0 < ε < ε (where ε is given as in Section 5.1) so that (−ε , ε ) 4 ⊂ U (where U is given as in (5.28)), and P −1 z ∈ C × D for all z ∈ (−ε , ε ) 4 . Denote (−ε , ε ) by S. Pick any (z 1 , z 2 ) ∈ S 2 . Define (x 1 , x 2 ) = (x * , x * ) + (z 1 , z 2 ). Then the sequence {x t } satisfying x t+2 = h(x t , x t+1 ) for t ≥ 1 is well-defined and x t → x * as t → ∞. Thus, the sequence {z t } satisfying z t = x t − x * for t ≥ 1 is well-defined and z t → 0 as t → ∞. Further, since (z 1 , z 2 ) ∈ S 2 , we have z t ∈ S for all t ≥ 1 (by the proof of Theorem 2). Then, we have:
(z t , z t+1 , z t+2 , z t+3 ) ∈ U f or t ≥ 1 (5.49) and: f(P −1 (z t , z t+1 , z t+2 , z t+3 )) = P −1 (z t+1 , z t+2 , z t+3 , z t+4 ) for t ≥ 1 (5.55)
We can infer from (5.55) that: f n (P −1 (z 1 , z 2 , z 3 , z 4 )) = P −1 (z n+1 , z n+2 , z n+3 , z n+4 ) f or n ≥ 1 (5.56)
Since the right hand-side of (5.56) converges to (0, 0, 0, 0) as n → ∞, we must have f n (P −1 (z 1 , z 2 , z 3 , z 4 )) → (0, 0, 0, 0) as n → ∞. By the Stable Manifold Theorem, then, we must have:
Define a function ψ : S 2 → R 2 by:
Then ψ(0, 0) = (0, 0) and (5.57) shows that, given any z = (z 1 , z 2 ) ∈ S 2 , we must have P −1 (z, ψ(z)) ∈ graph(H). Thus, given any z ∈ S 2 , there is z ∈ C, such that:
Clearly, such a z must be unique. Thus, there is a function, K : S 2 → C such that: P −1 (z, ψ(z)) = (K(z), H(K(z))) for all z ∈ S 2 (5.58)
Note that since ψ(0, 0) = (0, 0), (5.58) implies that K(0, 0) = (0, 0). Defining S = S 2 ∩ E , we have from (5.58), P −1 (z, ψ(z)) = (K(z), H(K(z))) for all z ∈ S (5.59)
On the other hand, from (5.48), we have:
Since L 1 and L 2 are the unique functions satisfying (5.60) and (5.47), and since ψ(0, 0) = (0, 0) and K(0, 0) = (0, 0), we must have ψ = L 1 and K = L 2 on S . Since L 1 is C 1 on S , we can conclude that ψ is C 1 on S . Using the definition of ψ , it follows that the optimal policy function, h, is C 1 on S .
Concluding Remarks
The purpose of the paper was to complete the program sketched in the contribution of Samuelson (1971) , by providing both a complete local and global analysis of the model under which the standard results of the Ramsey model continue to hold even with dependence of tastes between periods. We approached the problem by trying to identify structures in the reduced form of the model under which this would be true. The reduced form model involves a utility function which depends on the values of the state variable (capital stock) at three successive dates (instead of the usual two).We showed that supermodularity of the reduced form utility function (in the three variables), and a single-crossing condition provides such a structure. The methods used indicate that our results should generalize to situations in which the reduced form utility function depends on the values of the state variable in more than three periods (which correspond to situations in which utility function used to evaluate current consumption depends on several periods of past consumption). We examined the implication of this structure for the model of Samuelson (1971) with intertemporal dependence of tastes. Our analysis indicated the conditions on the primitive form of the model under which the assumptions on the corresponding reduced form are met. It also indicated plausible scenarios in which the stated assumptions on the reduced-form would not be satisfied. Thus, identifying these assumptions provides a good handle on the richer dynamics that this model can generate when these assumptions fail; exploration of this topic is undertaken in Mitra and Nishimura (2001) .
Application of our methods to models of habit formation is a natural direction of enquiry. The model of Boyer (1978) on habit formation, where utility is assumed to be increasing both in current and in past consumption, can be accommodated in our framework. Other frameworks of habit formation, where utility is increasing in present consumption, but decreasing in past consumption, are ruled out by the basic assumptions of our model. However, we indicated with an example that our methods and results are valid in some of these frameworks of habit formation as well. Models of habit formation leading to non-concave utility functions cannot be directly addressed by the methods of this paper, and constitute a potentially interesting area of future research.
